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Abstract
Some well-known paradoxes in decision making (e.g., the
Allais paradox, the St. Petersburg paradox, the Ellsberg para-
dox, and the Machina paradox) reveal that choices conven-
tional expected utility theory predicts could be inconsistent
with empirical observations. So, solutions to these paradoxes
can help us better understand humans decision making ac-
curately. This is also highly related to the prediction power
of a decision-making model in real-world applications. Thus,
various models have been proposed to address these para-
doxes. However, most of them can only solve parts of the
paradoxes, and for doing so some of them have to rely on
the parameter tuning without proper justifications for such
bounds of parameters. To this end, this paper proposes a
new descriptive decision-making model, expected utility with
relative loss reduction, which can exhibit the same qualitative
behaviours as those observed in experiments of these para-
doxes without any additional parameter setting. In particular,
we introduce the concept of relative loss reduction to reflect
people’s tendency to prefer ensuring a sufficient minimum
loss to just a maximum expected utility in decision-making
under risk or ambiguity.
Introduction
Decision-making is a process of selecting one among avail-
able choices (Russell et al., 2010). In real-world applica-
tions, decisions often have to be made under risk or ambi-
guity (Ma, Xiong, and Luo, 2013; Luo, Zhong, and Leung,
2015). Here, decision making under risk means that the
consequence of a decision is uncertain but the probability
of each possibility is known, while decision making under
ambiguity means even the probability of each possibility is
unclear. Since such uncertainties are inevitable in real-world
applications, this topic is a central concern in decision sci-
ence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gul and Pesendorfer,
2014) and artificial intelligence (Dubois, Fargier, and Perny,
2003; Luo and Jennings, 2007; Ma, Luo, and Jiang, 2017).
Perhaps the most well-known theory for decision-making
under uncertainty is expected utility theory (Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). Specifically, it is about how to make
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optimal decisions under risk. It gives a normative interpreta-
tion for researchers in economics and artificial intelligence
to model applications related to rational agents.
Unfortunately, recent empirical studies, such as the Allais
paradox (Allais and Hagen, 2013), the St. Petersburg para-
dox (Joyce, 2011), the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961),
and the Machina paradox (Machina, 2009), have observed a
number of violations (i.e., humans’ choices in reality devi-
ated from those predicted by classic expected utility theory
(Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)). At the same time, in
many artificial intelligence applications such as recommen-
dation system, supply chain management, policy making,
human-computer negotiation, and security surveillance sys-
tem, human decision-making behaviour indeed is an essen-
tial concern and computers often need to predict precisely
human decisions under uncertainty. For example, if a gov-
ernment policy-making support system cannot understand
how the people will respond to a policy, it is questionable to
recommend the policy to the government (Zhan et al., 2018).
Since the classic utility theory cannot predict human de-
cisions observed in these paradoxes, various generalised ex-
pected utility theories and ambiguity decision models have
been proposed to account the paradoxes. However, most of
them can only resolve parts of the paradoxes, and some of
them (e.g., (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Quiggin, 2012;
Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014)) can only solve the paradoxes
by adding some extra parameters, which means that these
models only work in cases that the bounds of parameter
variations are already known. Unfortunately, this makes it
hard to evaluate the predication power of the models in a
new decision-making problem (more detailed discussion can
be found in related work section).
To address this issue, this paper introduces a new concept,
called relative loss reduction, which is based on the human
nature of loss aversion, which has been convincingly con-
firmed by many psychological and economic experiments
(Kahneman, 2003). In psychology, loss aversion refers to
people’s tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring
equivalent gains (Kahneman, 2003). In this paper, we in-
terpret the meaning of loss in two cases: (i) the difference
between the minimum utilities of any two choices; and (ii)
the span of the expected utility interval of a choice. In the
first case, the loss aversion means a decision maker prefers
a choice with higher minimum utility, ceteris paribus; and
in the second case, the loss aversion means a decision maker
prefers a choice with less ambiguous, ceteris paribus. And
since the two interpretations are based on the comparison of
multiple values and normally a decision maker cares about
the reduction of loss in a decision making problem, we call
these two interpretations as relative loss reduction.
Then, we construct a formal descriptive decision-making
model to explore how this concept helps to make an
optimal choice in decision-making and address three
well-documented deviations from expected utility theory
without any extra parameter: (i) Allais-style evidence: a
decision maker prefers the choice with certain reward to the
choice under risk, but reverses this ordering if both choices
are mixed with an undesirable possible consequence. Thus,
it shows violations of the independence axiom. (ii) St.
Petersburg-style evidence: a decision maker only wants
to pay a very small amount of money to play a particular
lottery game that has a random consequence with a huge
expected utility. (iii) Ellsberg-style evidence: a decision
maker has the nature of ambiguity aversion in case that the
precise probabilities of some possible consequences of the
choices are unavailable.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Firstly, we give the formal definition of decision problems
under uncertainty, and recap the methods to obtain expected
utilities and expected utility intervals. Secondly, we present
our decision-making model that reflects the human nature
of loss aversion in making an optimal choice and reveal
some insights into our model. Thirdly, we further validates
our model by showing that it can resolve four well-known
paradoxes. Fourthly, we discuss the related work. Finally,
we conclude the paper with further work.
Problem Definition
In this section, we give a formal definition for the problem
of decision-making under uncertainty (including risk and
ambiguity), and recap the notions of expected utility (Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1944), and expected utility interval
(Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004).
Definition 1 A decision problem under uncertainty is a 4-
tuple (S,C, u,Q),1 where:
(i) S is a set of all the possible states;
(ii) C is a convex set of all the available choices. That is,
if c1, c2 ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1], then a uncertain choice
λc1 + (1 − λ)c2, meaning to choose c1 with a chance
of λ and choose c2 with a chance of 1−λ, is also in C.
(iii) u is a mapping fromC×S toR, representing the utility
of making choice c ∈ C in state s ∈ S.
(iv) ∆(S) = {p | p : S→ [0, 1],∑si∈S p(si) = 1}, i.e., the
set of all the probability distributions p over S.
(v) Q is a subset of ∆(S), representing the probability
assignments for each state s ∈ S.
1This paper considers the decision problem with choice-state
independence to simplify the issue. However, in future it is worth
studying whether or not that our model can be applied to the cases
of choice-state dependence as well.
Then by Definition 1, a decision problem under risk is a
4-tuple (S,C, u, {p}), where p ∈ Q is a unique probability
distribution for the decision maker to represent the precise
probability value for each state. Whilst, a decision problem
under ambiguity is a 4-tuple (S,C, u,Q), where |Q| > 1,
representing multiple probability values for some states.
The most widely used model of decision making under
uncertainty is expected utility theory (Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944), in which expected utility of a choice is
given as follows:
EU(c) =
∑
si∈S
p(si)u(c, si). (1)
For a decision problem under ambiguity, Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) introduce the concept of
expected utility interval of a choice c as follows:
Definition 2 Given a decision problem under ambiguity
(S,C, u,Q), the expected utility interval of a choice c,
denoted as EUI(c) = [E(c), E(c)], is given by:
E(c) = min
p∈Q
EUp(c), (2)
E(c) = max
p∈Q
EUp(c). (3)
Decision-Making with Relative Loss Reduction
This section will reveal some insights into the concept of
relative loss reduction in decision-making under risk and
decision making under ambiguity.
As mentioned previously, the idea of relative loss reduc-
tion is based on the human nature of loss aversion. Usually,
loss aversion means that the focus is on the real loss in a
decision making problem. For example, one who losed $100
loses more satisfaction than another who gains satisfaction
from a windfall of $100. Nevertheless, this human nature
occurs not only in the case that the real consequence of a
choice is negative, but also in the case the possible conse-
quence of a choice may be worse than the decision maker’s
expectation. For example, in decision making under risk,
suppose choice a is to win $80 with a chance of 50% and
to win $20 with a chance of 50%; and choice b is to win
$100 with a chance of 50% and get nothing with a chance of
50%. Then a decision maker, who makes choice b, suffers
an anticipated loss aversion: if choice b turns out to be
zero, I will lost at least $20 since it is the minimum utility
I can obtain by making choice a. Similarly, for decision
making under ambiguity, if choice a is to win $100 with
a chance between 0 and 2/3 and to get nothing otherwise,
and choice b is to win $100 with a chance of 1/3 and to
get nothing otherwise, then a decision maker, who makes
choice a, suffers another anticipated loss aversion: if the
real probability of wining $100 is 0, I will loss $100 with
a chance of 1/3 since it is the minimum probability of
obtaining $100 by making choice b.
According to the above intuitions, we can interpret two
types of loss aversion as follows. (i) Worst Case Loss
Aversion: This happens when the worst consequence of
the choice made is worse than the worst consequence of
other choices, and it is due to the uncertainty of the states
of the world and the comparison of multiple choices. (ii)
Ambiguity Loss Aversion: This happens when the expected
utility of a choice is unclear (i.e., it is interval-valued), and
it is due to the uncertainty of the probability of some states
of world and the comparison of multiple choices. Since the
two types of loss aversion are based on the comparison of
multiple choices and the loss aversions lead the decision
maker to make a choice with less loss, we call the concept
relative loss reduction.
Based on the above understanding of relative loss reduc-
tion, in the following we will establish a formal model to
predict the behaviour of an anticipated loss aversion prone-
ness decision maker.
Risky Expected Utility with Relative Loss
Reduction
First, we discuss a decision problem under risk. For this
problem, since the expected utility of a choice is determined
by expected utility theory, we only need to consider the
influence of the worst case loss aversion. Formally, we can
define expected utility with relative loss reduction (RLR) for
decision problems under risk (or simple risky expected utility
with RLR) and accordingly set the preference ordering as
follows:
Definition 3 For a decision problem under risk (S, C, u,
{p}), let si ∈ S (j = 1, . . . , n) be a state of the world,
u(c, si) be the utility of a choice c ∈ C at state si ∈ S, and
EU(c) be the expected utility value given by formula (1).
Then the risky expected utility with relative loss reduction
(RLR) of a choice c ∈ C, denoted as Lr(c), is given by:
Lr(c)=EU(c)−(max
c′∈C
min
si∈S
u(c′,si)−min
sj∈S
u(c,sj)). (4)
For any two choices c1 and c2, the preference ordering based
on risky expected utility with RLR, denoted as r, is defined
as:
c1 r c2 ⇔ Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c2). (5)
In Definition 3, the loss aversion in risk is represented as
max
ci∈C
min
sj∈S
u(ci, sj)−min
sk∈S
u(c1, sk),
which actually is the distance between the maximum mini-
mum utility of any choice ci ∈ C and the minimum utility
of a selected choice c1. Moreover, since the effect only
occurs when the minimum consequence of a choice is worse
than other choices, we can find that for a choice with the
maximum minimum utility, the worst case loss aversion
should be 0. And Lr(c1) shows the reduced expected utility
of a choice under the influence of anticipated worst case
loss aversion. Finally, since for a decision making problem
(S,C, u,Q) with |Q| > 1 the expected utility is interval-
valued, more factors should be considered when we extend
Definition 3 to the case of ambiguity (this will be discussed
in next section).
Let us consider the following example:
Example 1 Alice is thinking about investing $240K
in stock. And she considers a stock offered by Bob (an
investment advisor) that give she $150K with a chance
of 30% and $300K with a chance of 70% after one year.
Clearly, by formula (1), the expected utility is 255K.
However, by Definition 3, since the minimum expected
utility of rejecting this offer is 240K and that of accepting
the offer is $150K, after considering the loss aversion in
risk (i.e., 240K − 150K = 90K), the risky expected utility
with RLR of accepting the offer is 165K (i.e., 255K−90K),
while that of rejecting the offer is 240K. Thus, Alice should
reject the offer.
Now, in the following theorem we reveal some properties
about the preference ordering set in Definition 3:
Theorem 1 Let C be a finite choice set, S be a state set,
and EU(c) be the expected utility of choice c. Then for any
c1, c2, c3 ∈ C, the preference ordering r satisfies:
1. Weak Order: (i) Either c1 r c2 or c2 r c1; and (ii) if
c1 r c2 and c2 r c3, then c1 r c3.
2. Archimedean Axiom: If c1 r c2 and c2 r c3, then
there exist λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) such that
λc1 + (1− λ)c3 r c2 r µc1 + (1− µ)c3.
3. Monotonicity: If for any q ∈ ∆(S) satisfying q(si) = 1
(si∈S), we have c1r c2, then c1r c2 for any p∈∆(S).
4. Sen’s property: If c1 r c2 in a choice set C, then for any
choice set C ′, such as c1, c2 ∈ C ′, we have c1 r c2.
5. Limited Constant Independence: If c1 r c2 and c∗ is a
choice with certain consequence that satisfies EU(c∗) ≥
min
i=1,2
min
sj∈S
{u(ci, sj)}, then
λc1 + (1− λ)c∗ r λc2 + (1− λ)c∗
for any λ ∈ (0, 1].
6. Certainty Effect: IfEU(c1) = EU(c∗) and c∗ is a choice
with certain consequence, then c∗ r c1.
Proof: We check the properties in this theorem one by one.
(i) Since Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c2) or Lr(c1) ≤ Lr(c2) holds
for any c1, c2 ∈ C, by Definition 3, we have c1 r c2 or
c2 r c1. Moreover, suppose c1 r c2 and c2 r c3. Then
by Definition 3, we have Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c2) and Lr(c2) ≥
Lr(c3). As a result, Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c3). Thus by Definition 3,
we have c1 r c3. So, property 1 holds.
(ii) Suppose c1 r c2 and c2 r c3. Then by Definition
3, we have Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c2) and Lr(c2) ≥ Lr(c3). Since
Lr(ci) ∈ < for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, by the continuity of the real
number, there exists λ, µ ∈ (0, 1), such that
λLr(c1)+(1−λ)Lr(c3)≥Lr(c2)≥µLr(c1)+(1−µ)Lr(c3).
Thus, by Definition 3 and the choice set is convex, property
2 holds.
(iii) Suppose for any q ∈∆(S) satisfying q(si) = 1 (si ∈
S), we have c1 r c2. Then by Definitions 1 and 3, we have
u(c1, s)≥u(c2, s) for ∀s∈S. Thus, by formula (1), we have
EU(c1)≥EU(c2). Hence, by Definitions 3 and the fact that
min
si∈S
u(c1, si) ≥ min
sj∈S
u(c2, sj), we can obtain c1 r c2.
Thus, property 3 holds.
(iv) Let t= max
ci∈C
min
s∈S
u(ci, s) and t′= max
cj∈C′
min
s∈S
u(cj , s).
Then by Definition 3 and c1r c2 in a choice set C, we have
EU(c1)−(t−min
s∈S
u(c1, s)) ≥ EU(c2)−(t−min
s∈S
u(c2, s)).
Hence, from the fact that t = t′ − (t′ − t), we know that
Lr(c1) ≥ Lr(c2) in choice set C ′. Thus, property 4 holds.
(v) Let min
s∈S
u(c1, s)=k1, min
s∈S
u(c2, s)=k2, EU(c∗)=a,
and max
ci∈C
min
s∈S
u(ci, s) = t, where t > λk1 + (1−λ)a and
t > λk2+(1−λ)a. Then, by c1 r c2 and Definition 3, we
have:
λEU(c1)+(1−λ)a−(t−(λk1+(1−λ)a))
≥ λEU(c2)+(1−λ)a−(t−(λk2+(1−λ)a)).
Thus, by formula (5), property 5 holds.
(vi) Let EU(c1) = EU(c∗) = a and min
s∈S
u(c1, s) = k1.
Then, by formula (1), a ≥ k1. Hence, by Definition 3, we
have
a− (a− a) ≥ a− (a− k1).
Thus, by formula (5), we have c∗ r c1. So property 6 holds.

Properties 1-3 in the above theorem are the standard ax-
ioms in expected utility theory (Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). The first means a preference ordering can compare
any pair of choices and satisfies transitivity. The second
works like a continuity axiom on preferences, asserting that
no choice is either infinitely better or infinitely worse than
any other choices. The third is the requirement of mono-
tonicity, asserting that if a decision maker does not think
the utility of one choice is worse than the potential obtained
utility of another choice on each state of world, then the
former choice is conditionally preferred to the latter. And
property 4 is implied by expected utility theory, meaning
eliminating some of the unchosen choice should not affect
the optimal choice.
The rest of the properties in the above theorem are our
own. The fifth requires that the ranking of choices is not
affected by mixing a choice with certain consequence, which
has a higher utility than the minimum utilities of the choices.
Intuitively the violations of independence should be due
only to the worst case utility, rather than the uncertainty of
states. So, the property gives the essence of worst case loss
aversion: decision makers really care about the minimum
utility they could obtain by making a choice. The sixth
means the decision maker prefers a choice with a sure gain
to risky one if they have the same expected utility. In fact, the
property somehow describes the certainty effect (Kahneman,
2011) for decision makers in real-world applications.
Ambiguous Expected Utility with Relative Loss
Reduction
Now, we turn to decision problems under ambiguity. In this
case, a decision maker manifests a worst case loss aversion
as well as an ambiguity loss aversion.
For the first type of loss aversion in decision making un-
der ambiguity, based on the maximum expected utility (see
Definition 2) and Definition 3, its effect can be measured by:
E(c)− (max
c′∈C
min
si∈S
u(c′, si)−min
sj∈S
u(c, sj)), (6)
where E(c) is the maximum expected utility of choice c.
Since the excepted utility interval is determined by the
uncertainty of the probability as well as the utility of the
consequences of a choice, the second type of loss aversion
is determined by the ambiguity degree of the expected utility
as well as the difference between maximum expected utility
and minimum expected utility. For the ambiguity degree, it
means the extent of the uncertainty about the probability
distribution with respect to a choice.
Let us consider the following example:
Example 2 (Example 1 continued) After Alice rejects the
first offer, Bob offers her two new stocks whose prices heav-
ily depend on the monetary policy. According to the market
survey of the trend of monetary policy, there is one in three
chances that the government will adopt a normal monetary
policy (n) and there is two in three chances that the gov-
ernment will change the monetary policy, it is either being
expansionary (e) or contractionary (c). Then, (i) c1 is to get
$300K if the monetary policy is normal, and get $240K
otherwise; and (ii) c2 is to win $300K if the monetary policy
is expansionary, and get $240K otherwise.
Clearly, in this example, state set S is {n, e, c}. Since it
is unclear how many chances the monetary policy will be
expansionary or contractionary, there exist multiple values
of the probability of a state (e.g., the probability of ex-
pansionary monetary policy can be any value in [0, 2/3]).
Thus, the probability distribution over the possible states
is uncertain. In order to consider its ambiguity degree, we
first need to define the structure of the multiple probability
distributions over the state set in such a decision-making
under ambiguity as follows:
Definition 4 For a decision problem under uncertainty (S,
C, u,Q), a partition [S] = {S1, . . . , Sn} of the state set S is
a structure partition of the decision problem that reveals the
essence of the uncertain probability distribution over state
set S if it satisfies:2
• there exists a precise probability function q : [S]→ [0, 1],
such that
∑
Si∈[S]
q(Si)=1;
• for any Si ∈ [S], Si = {sk, . . . sl} and for any proba-
bility distribution p ∈ Q over all states in Si, we have∑
s∈Si
p(s)=q(Si); and
• for any |Si| > 1 (Si ∈ [S]), each nonempty proper subset
of Si has multiple probability values.
In fact, inspired by the definition of mass function of D-
S theory, Definition 4 defines a unique probability distri-
bution q over [S] for Q. By Definition 4, in Example 2,
2A partition [S] = {S1, . . . , Sn} means that (i) Si 6= ∅ (i =
1, . . . , n), (ii) S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn = S, and (iii) Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for any
Si 6= Sj and Si, Sj ∈ {S1, . . . , Sn}.
suppose {n, e, c} is the state set, then the structure partition
is [S] = {{n}, {e, c}} with the probability 1/3 for {n} and
2/3 for {e, c}. However, the partition of {{n}, {e}, {c}} is
not a structure partition, since there does not exist a precise
probability value for {e} or {c}. And {{n, e, c}} is not a
structure partition either, because the probability of subset
{n} or {e, c} has a unique value.
Clearly, by
∑
si∈S p(si) = 1 and Definition 4, we can
easily prove that for any decision problem under uncertainty,
there exists a structure partition. Now, based on Definition
4, we can formally define the ambiguity degree of a given
choice as follows:
Definition 5 For a decision problem under uncertainty (S,
C, u,Q), let [S] = {S1, . . . , Sn} be a structure partition,
q(Si) (i = 1, . . . , n) be the precise probability value as-
signed to Si ∈ [S], Uc = {u(c, s) | s ∈ S} be the set
of all the possible utilities of making choice c, and Vi =
{u(c, sj) | sj ∈ Si, Si ∈ [S]} be the set of potentially
obtained utilities of state set Si ∈ [S]. Then the ambiguity
degree of choice c, denoted as δc, is given by:
δc =
n∑
i=1
q(Si)
log2 |Vi|
log2 |Uc|
. (7)
In fact, Definition 5 is inspired by the generalised Hartley
measure for non-specificity (Dubois and Prade, 1985) in D-
S theory. By q(Si) log2 |Vi|, it means that the higher the
probability value and the more number of the potentially
obtained utilities involved in the probability value, the more
ambiguity the decision maker suffers in a state set Si. Fi-
nally, for Example 2, by Definition 5, we can find δc1 = 0
and δc2 = 2/3. Clearly, the greater the ambiguity degree
of a choice, the higher the value that is to be assigned to
the minimum expected utility to show the ambiguity loss
aversion the decision maker manifests.
Together with the worst case loss aversion in decision
making under ambiguity (which is defined in formula (6)),
we can formally define an expected utility with relative loss
reduction in decision making under ambiguity (or simple
ambiguous expected utility with RLR) and accordingly set
the preference ordering as follows:
Definition 6 For a decision problem under ambiguity (S,
C, u,Q) with |Q| > 1. The ambiguous expected utility with
RLR of choice c, denoted as La(c), is given by:
La(c) =E(c)− δc(E(c)−E(c))− (max
c′∈C
min
si∈S
u(c′, si)
−min
sj∈S
u(c, sj)). (8)
Then, for any two choices c1 and c2, the preference ordering
based on the ambiguous expected utility with RLR, denoted
as a, is defined as follows:
c1 a c2 ⇔ La(c1) ≥ La(c2). (9)
By Definition 6, we can define two types of loss aversion
effect in a decision problem under ambiguity with one for-
mula. That is,E(c) in formula (8) says that a decision maker
expects the maximum expected utility in a given decision
problem. However, since the maximum expected utility is
obtained in case of ambiguity, the decision maker also re-
duces his evaluation of the choice according to his nature
of the ambiguity loss aversion. And δc(E(c)−E(c)) means
that the ambiguity loss aversion is determined by the ambi-
guity degree and the distance of maximum expected utility
and minimum expected utility. Finally, max
c′∈C
min
si∈S
u(c′, si)−
min
sj∈S
u(c, sj) represents the worst case loss aversion of the
decision maker.
Let us consider the following example:
Example 3 (Example 2 continued) Since these two new
stocks offered by Bob suffer no loss of capital, Alice
only needs to decide which one she should accept. First,
she calculates the expected utility intervals of both
choices by Definition 2, and obtain EUI(c1) = 260 and
EUI(c2) = [240, 280]. Then, after considering worst case
loss aversion and ambiguity loss aversion of herself, she
decides to make her decision based on the ambiguous
expected utility with RLR. Thus, by Definition 5, she
obtains δc1 = 0 and δc2 = 2/3. So, by the fact that the
maximin utility of these two choices is 240K. As a result,
by Definition 6, she has La(c1) = 260 and La(c2) = 253.3.
Thus, she chooses c1.
Now, we can show the relationship between the risky ex-
pected utility with RLR and the ambiguous expected utility
with RLR by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Risky expected utility with RLR is a special case
of ambiguous expected utility with RLR.
Proof: For a decision problem under risk (S,C, u, {p}),
suppose p(si) is a precise probability value assigned to a
state si ∈ S, u(c, si) be the utility of the consequence that
makes choice c in state si. Then by Definition 2, we have:
E(c) = E(c) = EU(c) =
∑
si∈S
p(si)u(c, si).
Moreover, by Definitions 4 and 5, we have δc = 0. There-
fore, for a given choice c, by Definition 6, we have
La(c)=EU(c)−
∑
si∈S
p(si)[EU(c)−u(c, si)] =Lr(c).

By Theorem 2, it means that we can use Definition 6 to
obtain the expected utility with RLR of each choice for any
decision problem under uncertainty. Thus, without losing
generality, we can use La(c) to represent the expected utility
with relative loss reduction under uncertainty.
Also, the following theorem gives some properties for
ambiguous expected utility with RLR:
Theorem 3 Let C be a finite choice set and the interval-
valued expected utility of choice ci ∈ C be EUI(ci) =
[E(ci), E(ci)], and its ambiguity degree be δci . Then for two
choices c1 and c2 with the same minimum utility, the binary
relation a over C satisfies:
Table 1: Allais’ Decision Situation Design
g1 g2 g3 g4
Gain p Gain p Gain p Gain p
$100 100%
$100 89% 0 89%
0 90%
0 1%
$100 11%
$500 10% $500 10%
(i) if E(c1) > E(c2), E(c1) > E(c2), and δc1 ≤ δc2 ,
then c1 a c2;
(ii) if E(c1)≥E(c2) and δc1 =δc2 =1, then c1a c2; and
(iii) if EUI(c1)=EUI(c2) and δc1 < δc2 , then c1 a c2.
Proof: By Definition 6 and the fact that two choices c1 and
c2 have the same minimum utility, we can obtain the result
of Theorem 3 directly. 
In fact, for two choices with the same minimum utility,
property (i) of Theorem 3 means that if the ambiguity degree
of a choice is not more than that of another, and the worst
and the best expected utility of this choice is better than
those of another respectively, this choice should be made.
And property (ii) of Theorem 3 means that in the case of
absolute ambiguity, a decision maker should take maximin
attitude (i.e., compare their minimum expected utilities and
choose the best one). Finally, property (iii) reveals the rela-
tion between ambiguity degree and the preference ordering.
That is, a decision maker should make a choice with less
ambiguous, ceteris paribus.
Paradox Analysis
This section resolves four paradoxes using our model.
The Allais paradox (Allais and Hagen, 2013) is a choice
problem that shows expected utility theory is problematic.
Suppose a decision maker needs to make a choice between
two gambles: g1 and g2, or g3 and g4. The payoff for each
gamble in each experiment is as shown in Table 1. Allais
discovered that most participants picked g1 rather than g2,
or alternatively most participants picked g4 rather than g3.
However, this result is inconsistent with what expected util-
ity theory predicts.
Using our model, by Definition 3, we have:
Lr(g1)=100, Lr(g2)=139−(100−0)=39,
Lr(g3)=11−(0−0)=11, Lr(g4)=50−(0−0)=50.
Thus, for a decision maker, we have g1 r g2 and g4 r g3.
This result is the same as the observation of Allais. In fact,
our model is able to not only resolve the Allais paradox,
but also reveal the limitation of the influence about certainty
effect. For instance, if g2 has a chance of 89% to win $100,
a chance of 1% to win $0, and a chance of 10% to win
$50, 000, there is no doubt that most of people prefer g2 to
g1. And if g2 has a chance of 89% to win $100, a chance of
1% to win $70, and a chance of 10% to win $500, people
should also prefer g2 to g1.
The St. Petersburg game (Joyce, 2011) is played by
flipping a fair coin until it comes up tails, and the total
Table 2: The Ellsberg Paradox
30 balls 60 balls
r: red b: blue g: green
c1 $100 $0 $0
c2 $0 $100 $0
c3 $100 $0 $100
c4 $0 $100 $100
number of flips n determines the prize, which equals $2n.
Then, by formula (1), the expected utility of this game is∑∞
n=1
1
2n 2
n =∞.3 In other words, a decision maker should
be willing to pay any price to enter this game. Nevertheless,
obviously some prices might be too high for a rational
decision maker to pay for playing. Moreover, even with the
rebuttal that any dealer could only offer finite money for
another to play the St. Petersburg lottery, people still make
choices in finite St. Petersburg game, which is inconsistent
with expected utility theory (Cox, Sadiraj, and Vogt, 2008).
In fact, many people agree that “few of us would pay even
$25 to enter such a game” (Hacking, 1980).
Now, by using our model, based on the assumption of
finite St. Petersburg game, suppose the net worth of Bill
Gates in Forbes 2015 (W = $79.2 Billion) is the total
money that a potential player can offer, and a is the money
that the loss aversion proneness decision maker is willing
to pay. Then L = blog2(W )c = 36 is the maximum
number of times the dealer can fully cover the bet, and the
risky expected utility with RLR for playing the finite St.
Petersburg game is:
Lr(c) =
36∑
n=1
1
2n
× 2n + 2 W
2L+1
− (a− 0) = 37.15− a.
If a decision maker wants to play the game, by Definition
3, it means 37.15 − a ≥ a, and thus a < 18.6. Therefore,
since the agent cannot even offer the net worth of Bill Gates
money for such a game, it is no doubt that many people
are willing to pay less money for playing the game. By
considering the effect of worst case loss aversion, our model
indeed gives an explanation for the St. Petersburg game.
The Ellsberg paradox is a well-known, long-standing one
about ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961). Suppose in an urn con-
taining 90 balls, 30 is red, and the rest are either blue or
green, and a decision maker faces two pairs of decision
problems, each involving a decision between two choices:
c1 and c2, or c3 and c4. A ball is randomly picked up from
the urn, and the return of selecting a ball for each choice
is shown in Table 2. Ellsberg found that a very common
pattern of human responses to these problems is: c1  c2
and c4  c3, which violates expected utility theory.
In the Ellsberg paradox, by Definition 4, the structure
partition is [S] = {{r}, {b, g}} with a chance of 1/3 for {r}
and a chance of 2/3 for {b, g}. Then, by Definitions 2, 5 and
3Here, although utility does not necessarily equal to money
value and Bernoulli claims that the logarithmic utility function can
handle this paradox in (Bernoulli, 1954), many have found this
response to the paradox unsatisfactory (Martin, 2014).
Table 3: 50:51 Example
50 balls 51 balls
e1 e2 e3 e4
c1 $80 $80 $40 $40
c2 $80 $40 $80 $40
c3 $120 $80 $40 $0
c4 $120 $40 $80 $0
6, we have:
La(c1) =
100
3
−(0− 0)= 100
3
,
La(c2) =
200
3
− 2
3
×(200
3
−0)−(0− 0)= 200
9
,
La(c3) = 100− 2
3
×(100− 100
3
)−(0− 0)= 500
9
,
La(c4) =
200
3
−(0− 0)= 200
3
.
Thus, we have c1 a c2 and c4 a c3.
Since the Ellsberg paradox shows that a decision maker
exhibits a preference for the choices with a deterministic
probability distribution over the choices with undetermine
probability distribution, it reveals a phenomenon, known as
ambiguity aversion. And our method can resolve this type
of paradox. Thus, our model indeed reflects the decision
maker’s ambiguity aversion nature by considering the influ-
ence of ambiguity loss aversion.
Recently, Machina (2009) has posed some questions re-
garding the ability of Choquet expected utility theory (Quig-
gin, 2012) and some well-known ambiguity decision models
to resolve variations of the Ellsberg paradox. And the ex-
amples of these questions are called the Machina paradox
(Machina, 2009).
The first example is shown in Table 3. In this 50:51
example, the pair of c1 and c2 and the pair of c3 and c4 differ
only in whether they offer the higher prize of $80 on event
e2 or event e3. As argued by Machina (2009), a decision
maker prefers c1 to c2, but the decision maker may feel that
the tiny ambiguity difference between c3 and c4 does not
offset c4 objective advantage (a slight advantage due to that
the 51st ball may yield $80), and therefore prefers c4 to c3.
Using our method, by Definition 4, the structure partition
is [S] = {{e1, e2}, {e3, e4}} with a chance of 50/101
for the set of {e1, e2} and a chance of 51/101 for the
set of {e3, e4}. Then, by Definitions 2, 5 and 6, we can
find La(c1) = 59.8, La(c2) = 40, La(c3) = 59.6, and
La(c4) = 59.8. Thus, we have c1 a c2 and c4 a c3.
Moreover, for c1 and c2, although c2 has a slight advantage
due to that the 51st ball may yield $80, a decision maker
still chooses c1 because of ambiguity aversion. Whilst, for
c3 and c4, since the ambiguity degree for both choices are
the same, the slight advantage of c4 influences the decision
maker’s choice. In other words, our method can consider
the ambiguity aversion of the decision maker as well as the
advantage of a higher utility for a decision making under
ambiguity. So, our model covers well the 50:51 example in
the Machina paradox.
Now, we consider the second type of the Machina para-
dox, called the reflection example in Table 4. In this ex-
Table 4: Reflection Example
50 balls 51 balls
e1 e2 e3 e4
c1 $40 $80 $40 $0
c2 $40 $40 $80 $0
c3 $0 $80 $40 $40
c4 $0 $40 $80 $40
ample, since c4 is an informationally symmetric left-right
reflection of c1 and c3 is a left-right reflection of c2, any
decision maker who prefers c1 to c2 should have the “re-
flected” ranking that prefers c4 to c3. And if c2  c1
then c3  c4. The experimental analyses of L’Haridon
and Placido (2008) found that over 90 percent of subjects
expressed strict preference in the reflection problems, and
that roughly 70 percent manifest the structure c1  c2 and
c4  c3 or c2  c1 and c3  c4. And such a result cannot
be explained well by most of ambiguity decision models
(Baillon and Placido, 2011).
Nonetheless, using our method, by Definition 4, the struc-
ture partition is [S] = {{e1, e2}, {e3, e4}} with a chance of
1/2 for {e1, e2} and a chance of 1/2 for {e3, e4}. Then, by
Definitions 2, 5 and 6, we can find La(c1) =La(c4) = 34.8
and La(c2) = La(c3) = 47.4. Thus, c2 a c1 and c3 a c4.
So, our method can also explain the reflection example.
Related Work
There are two strands of literature related to our analyses
on the four well-known paradoxes. First, there are various
generalised expected utility theories and ambiguity decision
models that focus on some of the paradoxes. Generalised ex-
pected utility theories include prospect theory (PT) (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1990), regret theory (RT) (Bleichrodt and
Wakker, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016), rank-dependent expected
utility (REU) (Quiggin, 2012; Jeantet and Spanjaard, 2011),
cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Barberis, 2013; Wang, Wang, and Martnez, 2017).
Ambiguity decision models include maxmin expected utility
(MEU) (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Troffaes, 2007), vari-
ational preferences (VP) (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rus-
tichini, 2006; De Marco and Romaniello, 2015), α-maximin
(αM) (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004) and
a smooth model of ambiguity aversion (SM) (Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005). However, all of them cannot
provide an explanation for all the paradoxes we analysed in
this paper. In addition, our model is different from the most
famous descriptive decision-making model (i.e., prospect
theory ) in the following aspects: (i) they need some extra
parameters, but we do not; and (ii) they cannot resolve St.
Petersburg paradox, Ellsberg paradox and Machina paradox
and even its extension version (i.e., cumulative prospect the-
ory) cannot resolve Machina paradox, either; but our model
can resolve them all without setting any extra parameter.
Second, recently some decision models (Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2014) were proposed with the claim of
resolving these paradoxes with some parameter variations.
For example, the expected uncertainty utility (EUU) theory
Table 5: Models Comparison
PT RT REU CPT MEU VP αM SM EUU ours
A +p +p +p +p N ∗ N ∗ +p Y
S N N ∗ +p N N N N ∗ Y
E N +p +p +p Y +p +p +p +p Y
M N N N N N N N N +P Y
(Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014) resolves the paradoxes based
on the interval-valued expected utility and the utility
indexes (a parameter variation) applied to the upper and
lower bounds of the interval. Nevertheless, such a model
has the following limitations: (i) it is unclear why a decision
maker chooses different utility indexes in different decision
problems; and (ii) since the utility indexes are obtained after
the human selection of a given decision problem is known,
it is unclear whether or not the utility indexes have the same
predication power for any new problem.
Finally, Table 5 summarises the models comparison in
solving four well-known paradoxes, where A stands for the
Allais paradox, S stands for the St. Petersburg paradox, E
stands for the Ellsberg paradox, M stands for the Machina
paradox, +p means the model can solve a paradox with
some additional parameters, N means the model cannot
solve a paradox, Y means the model can solve a paradox
without any additional parameter, and ∗ means it is unclear
whether or not the model can resolve a paradox.
Conclusion
This paper proposed a new decision model based on the
human nature of loss aversion to address four well-known
paradoxes (Allais and Hagen, 2013; Ellsberg, 1961; Joyce,
2011; Machina, 2009) at the same time without any addi-
tional parameter. More specifically, we distinguished two
types of loss aversion: worst case loss aversion and ambigu-
ity loss aversion in decision making under uncertainty, and
proposed the formal definition of relative loss reduction in
decision problems under risk or ambiguity. Then, we proved
that the loss aversion in decision problems under risk or
ambiguity can be defined by our unifying decision model
with relative loss reduction. Moreover, we proved that some
desirable properties can hold for our risky expected utility
with relative loss reduction or ambiguous expected utility
with relative loss reduction. Finally, we validated our models
by resolving the four famous paradoxes and demonstrated
that such a resolution without any additional parameter can-
not be achieved by the existing decision models.
There are many possible extensions to our work.
Perhaps the most interesting one is the axiomatisation
and psychological experimental analyses of our method.
Another tempting avenue is to extend our model for
resolving some paradoxes in multi-criteria decision making
and game theory. Finally, it is worth discussing the use
of our method in some real-word applications such as
health care, e-commerce, supply chain management, policy
making, human-computer negotiation, security surveillance
system and decision-theoretic planning.
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